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a b s t r a c t
This paper studiesDawid’s prequential framework from thepoint of viewof the algorithmic
theory of randomness. Our first main result is that two natural notions of randomness
coincide. One notion is the prequential version of the measure-theoretic definition due
to Martin-Löf, and the other is the prequential version of the game-theoretic definition
due to Schnorr and Levin. This is another manifestation of the close relation between
the two main paradigms of randomness. The algorithmic theory of randomness can be
stripped of its algorithmic aspect and still give meaningful results; the measure-theoretic
paradigm then corresponds to Kolmogorov’s measure-theoretic probability and the game-
theoretic paradigm corresponds to game-theoretic probability. Our second main result
is that measure-theoretic probability coincides with game-theoretic probability on all
analytic (in particular, Borel) sets.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We consider the following on-line learning protocol:
Probability forecasting of binary observations
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .:
Learner announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Reality announces yn ∈ {0, 1}.
END FOR.
Intuitively, pn is Learner’s subjective probability that yn = 1 after having observed y1, . . . , yn−1 and taking account of all
other relevant information available at the time of issuing the forecast. We will refer to pn as forecasts and to yn as outcomes.
When can we say that Learner is doing a good job of forecasting? Or as we shall say, when is the sequence of outcomes
(y1, y2, . . .) ‘‘random’’ with respect to the sequence of forecasts (p1, p2, . . .)? (We further abbreviate this by saying that the
sequence (p1, y1, p2, y2, . . .) containing both forecasts and outcomes is random.) This paper demonstrates the equivalence
of two superficially quite different answers to this question.
1.1. Standard theory
The simplest, and well studied, situation is where the forecasts are produced as conditional probabilities from a com-
putable probability distribution P on {0, 1}∞: pn is the conditional probability according to P that yn = 1 given y1, . . . , yn−1.
In this case it is natural to talk about the randomness of (y1, y2, . . .)with respect to P rather thanwith respect to (p1, p2, . . .).
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The two fundamental paradigms of randomness are measure-theoretic and game-theoretic. The first paradigm is usually
referred to as typicality, and various flavours and modifications of the second paradigm are referred to as unpredictability,
stochasticity, chaoticity, and incompressibility (see below). This terminology, however, would be counterintuitive in the
general framework of this paper. (To some degree this is also true about the standard term ‘‘random’’, but the reader is
perhaps already accustomed to the technical meaning of this term being different from its everyday meaning.)
The game-theoretic notion of randomness is based, as can be guessed, on the idea of gaming: a sequence of outcomes is
regarded random if there is no computable way to become infinitely rich betting on its elements. Similarly, the measure-
theoretic notion is based on the idea ofmeasure: a sequence is regarded random if there is no computableway to specify a set
of measure zero containing this sequence. The standard game-theoretic definition of randomness is due to Schnorr [27] and
Levin ([18], Theorem3), and the standardmeasure-theoretic definition of randomness is due toMartin-Löf [21]. Schnorr [27]
and Levin [18] established the equivalence between the two definitions.
The measure-theoretic definition of randomness with respect to a non-computable probability distribution P was first
given by Levin [18] and later developed, modified, and applied in, e.g., [19,11,36,12,26].
Remark 1. The terms ‘‘typicality’’, ‘‘chaoticity’’, and ‘‘stochasticity’’ were used in [17]; ‘‘stochasticity’’ was introduced in
Kolmogorov’s earlier papers, and ‘‘typicality’’ and ‘‘chaoticity’’ were introduced in [17] itself. Modern literature often
talks about ‘‘unpredictability’’ and ‘‘incompressibility’’ (see, e.g., [1], Chapter 1). As we said, typicality is synonymous
with what we call measure-theoretic randomness, and the other four terms are various versions of game-theoretic
randomness. Unpredictability is synonymous with our game-theoretic randomness. Stochasticity is the game-theoretic
notion of randomness based on von Mises’s idea of subsequence selection rules, which Ville [31] showed to be inadequate
in some important respects. The synonyms ‘‘chaoticity’’ and ‘‘incompressibility’’ require that the algorithmic complexity
of initial fragments of the sequence should be close to its trivial upper bound. If the complexity is defined as the minus
logarithm of the a priori semimeasure, this is the same as unpredictability. However, other notions of complexity (such
as plain, prefix, and monotonic) have also been considered, and in this case chaoticity/incompressibility is sometimes
regarded as a third, information-theoretic, paradigm, based on coding; but in any case, this third paradigm is very close
to the game-theoretic one, as the connections between coding and gambling are straightforward and well understood (see,
e.g., [15,4], Chapter 6). Levin’s ([18], Theorem 3) representation of game-theoretic randomness is in terms of complexity
(the chaoticity/incompressibility approach) and Schnorr’s [27] is in terms of martingales (the unpredictability approach).
1.2. Prequential framework for randomness
The standard definitions of randomness mentioned in the previous subsection depend on knowing Learner’s probability
model P . Our forecasting protocol, however, only involves the realized forecasts pn, which are not assumed to be derived
from any P . This feature of the protocol greatly extends its area of application, allowing forecasts produced ‘‘on the fly’’.
Dawid’s prequential principle ([5]; it is called ‘‘M2’’ in [6] and ‘‘weak prequential principle’’ in [7,8]) says that our evaluation
of the quality of the forecasts p1, p2, . . . in light of the observed outcomes y1, y2, . . . should not depend on Learner’s model
P even if it exists and is known.
The first definition of randomness fully respecting the prequential principle was proposed by Dawid [6]. Dawid’s
definition, however, was based on von Mises’s idea of subsequence selection rules. Dawid ([6], Section 13.2) also gave a
brief description of a prequential definition based on Ville’s martingales, but did not elaborate on it. Chernov et al. [2]
give the details of the martingale definition in the case where the forecasts are only allowed to take values from a finite
set. This paper provides the details of the general martingale definition, which belongs to the game-theoretic paradigm.
It also gives a Bayesian definition of measure-theoretic randomness. Its main mathematical result says that the notions of
measure-theoretic randomness (called measure-randomness for brevity) and of game-theoretic randomness (called game-
randomness) coincide in the prequential framework.
1.3. This paper
In the following two sections we will introduce the two notions of randomness of a sequence of forecasts and
observations. Intuitively, (p1, y1, p2, y2, . . .) is random if the pn are good predictions of yn; slightly more precisely, if there is
no computable way to detect inadequacy of pn. The first definition, in Section 2, belongs to the game-theoretic paradigm and
the second, in Section 3, to the measure-theoretic paradigm. The equivalence between the two definitions, which is the first
main result of the paper, is stated in Section 4 as Theorem 1 and proved in Section 5. Section 6, which is new as compared to
the conference version [35] of this paper, casts Theorem 1 in terms of two kinds of prequential probability, game-theoretic
and measure-theoretic. Finally, in Section 7 we prove that the two kinds of prequential probability coincide on all analytic
sets. This is our second main result. It was stated in the conference paper [34] (and so this paper is a joint journal version
for [35,34]).
1.4. Some notation and definitions
The set of all natural (i.e., positive integer) numbers is denoted by N, N := {1, 2, . . .}; N0 is N extended by adding∞ and
0. As always, Q and R are the sets of all rational and real numbers, respectively.
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Let Ω := {0, 1}∞ be the set of all infinite binary sequences and Ω := {0, 1}∗ be the set of all finite binary sequences.
Set Π := ([0, 1] × {0, 1})∞ and Π := ([0, 1] × {0, 1})∗. The empty element (sequence of length zero) of both Ω and
Π will be denoted by Λ. In our applications, the elements ofΩ andΩ will be sequences of outcomes (infinite or finite),
and the elements ofΠ andΠ will be sequences of forecasts and outcomes (infinite or finite). The setΠ will sometimes be
referred to as the prequential space.
For x ∈ Ω, let Γx ⊆ Ω be the set of all infinite continuations of x. Similarly, for x ∈ Π, Γx ⊆ Π is the set of
all infinite continuations of x. For each ω = (y1, y2, . . .) ∈ Ω and n ∈ N, set ωn := (y1, . . . , yn). Similarly, for each
pi = (p1, y1, p2, y2, . . .) ∈ Π and n ∈ N, set pin := (p1, y1, . . . , pn, yn).
In Appendix and some proofs we will be using the following notation, for n ∈ N: Ωn := {0, 1}n is the set of all finite
binary sequences of length n; Ω≤n (resp. Ω≥n) is the set of all finite binary sequences of length at most (resp. at least) n;
Πn := ([0, 1] × {0, 1})n;Π≥n :=⋃∞i=n([0, 1] × {0, 1})i.
For understanding the intuitive meaning of our statements, the following intuitive idea of lower semicomputability will
suffice: a function f : X → R ∪ {∞} is lower semicomputable if there is an algorithm that, for all x ∈ X and r ∈ R,
will eventually tell us that f (x) > r if this inequality is indeed true. (Lower semicomputable functions are not necessarily
computable as the algorithm can work arbitrarily long.) Understanding the proofs requires precise definitions, as given in,
e.g., Appendix.
2. Game-randomness
A farthingale is a function V : Π → [−∞,∞] satisfying
V (p1, y1, . . . , pn−1, yn−1) = (1− pn)V (p1, y1, . . . , pn−1, yn−1, pn, 0)+ pnV (p1, y1, . . . , pn−1, yn−1, pn, 1) (1)
for all n and all (p1, y1, p2, y2, . . .) ∈ Π ; the products 0∞ and 0(−∞) are defined to be 0. If we replace ‘‘=’’ by ‘‘≥’’ in
(1), we get the definition of superfarthingales. These are prequential versions of the standard notions of martingale and
supermartingale, and in our terminology we follow [8]. We will be interested mainly in non-negative farthingales and
superfarthingales.
The value of a farthingale can be interpreted as the capital of a gambler betting according to the odds announced by
Learner. In the case of superfarthingales, the gambler is allowed to throw away part of his capital.
Lemma 1. Let V be the class of all non-negative lower semicomputable superfarthingales V with initial value V (Λ) = 1. There
exists a largest superfarthingale in V to within a constant factor. In other words, there exists a superfarthingale V ∈ V such that,
for any other superfarthingale V ′ ∈ V , there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for any x ∈ Π, V (x) ≥ V ′(x)/C.
Proof. Fix a universal computable sequence of lower semicomputable functions f1 : Π → [0,∞], f2 : Π → [0,∞], . . .
(see Lemma13 in Appendix). It is easy to construct a new computable sequence of lower semicomputable functions f ′1, f
′
2, . . .
such that each of f ′l is a superfarthingale in V and that f
′
l = fl whenever fl is already in V , l ∈ N. Then
∑∞
l=1 2−lf
′
l will be a
largest, to within a constant factor, superfarthingale in V . 
Let us fix a largest, to within a constant factor, superfarthingale U in V and call it the universal superfarthingale.
Definition 1. A sequence pi ∈ Π is called game-random if U(pin) stays bounded as n→∞.
The following lemma gives an equivalent definition of game-random sequences.
Lemma 2. A sequence pi ∈ Π is game-random if and only if U(pin) does not tend to infinity as n→∞.
Proof. Following the proof of Lemma 3.1 in [29], we can construct a superfarthingale V ∈ V such that lim infn→∞ V (pin) =
∞ whenever supn U(pin) = ∞. (Therefore, lim infn→∞ U(pin) = ∞ whenever supn U(pin) = ∞.) Indeed, for each m ∈ N,
the function Um : Π → [0,∞) defined by
Um(x) :=
{ 2m if U(y) > 2m for some prefix y of x
U(x) otherwise
is a superfarthingale; it is clear that it is lower semicomputable and so belongs to V . Since U1,U2, . . . is a computable
sequence of lower semicomputable functions, we can set
V :=
∞∑
m=1
2−mUm. 
3. Measure-randomness
We can also adapt the standard measure-theoretic definition of randomness to the prequential framework. First we give
an informal version of the definition.
A forecasting system is a function φ : Ω → [0, 1]. LetΦ be the set of all forecasting systems. For each φ ∈ Φ there exists
a unique probabilitymeasure Pφ onΩ such that, for each x ∈ Ω, Pφ(Γx1) = φ(x)Pφ(Γx). (In other words, such that φ(x) is a
version of the conditional probability, according toPφ , that xwill be followed by 1.) The notion of a forecasting system is close
to that of a probabilitymeasure onΩ: the correspondenceφ 7→ Pφ becomes an isomorphism if we only consider forecasting
systems taking values in the open interval (0, 1) and probability measures taking positive values on the sets Γx, x ∈ Ω.
V. Vovk, A. Shen / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 2632–2646 2635
Informally, we say that a sequence ω ∈ Ω is measure-random with respect to a forecasting system φ if it is random in
the sense of Martin-Löf [21] with respect to Pφ when φ is given as an oracle. We will formalize ‘‘given as an oracle’’ using
some simplest notions of effective topology (see Appendix). The following definition is a version of Levin’s ‘‘uniform test of
randomness’’ [18,19,12].
Definition 2. A uniform test of randomness is a lower semicomputable function T : Ω × Φ → N0 such that, for all φ ∈ Φ
and allm ∈ N,
Pφ{ω ∈ Ω | T (ω, φ) ≥ m} ≤ 2−m. (2)
Intuitively, T (ω, φ) is the amount of irregularities (measured in bits, according to (2)) discovered inωwith respect to φ. The
requirement of lower semicomputability means that the irregularities have to be genuine: a discovery of irregularity can
never be undone. We will usually drop the adjective ‘‘uniform’’.
Lemma 3. There exists a largest, to within an additive constant, test of randomness. In other words, there exists a test of
randomness T such that, for any other test of randomness T ′, there exists a constant C such that, for any (ω, φ) ∈ Ω × Φ ,
T (ω, φ) ≥ T ′(ω, φ)− C .
Proof. The proof is similar to the standard one given by Martin-Löf [21]; it will, however, crucially depend on the
compactness ofΦ , as in [18,12]. For each set G ⊆ Ω × Φ and each φ ∈ Φ we will use the notation
G[φ] := {ω ∈ Ω | (ω, φ) ∈ G}
for the φ-cut of G. A convenient alternative representation of a test of randomness T is as a computable sequence of nested
open sets G1 ⊇ G2 ⊇ · · · inΩ × Φ such that
Pφ(Gm[φ]) ≤ 2−m (3)
for all φ ∈ Φ and m ∈ N. This alternative representation will be referred to as the set representation, as opposed to the
original functional representation. It is easy to see that the two representations are indeed equivalent: when given T we can
set Gm := {(ω, φ) | T (ω, φ) ≥ m} (the sequence G1,G2, . . . of open sets is then computable by Lemma 14, which is uniform
in C), and when given G1,G2, . . . we can set T (ω, φ) := max{m | (ω, φ) ∈ Gm}. Such sequences G1,G2, . . . will also be
referred to as tests of randomness.
Let Gl,m be a universal computable family of sequences of open sets (cf. Lemma 12 in Appendix). Put G′l,m :=
⋂m
i=1 Gl,i, so
that G′l,m is a computable family of nested sequences of open sets containing all nested computable sequences of open sets.
We can further ‘‘trim’’ each G′l,m to G
′′
l,m so that:
• Pφ(G′′l,m[φ]) ≤ 2−m for all φ ∈ Φ;
• G′′l,m = G′l,m whenever Pφ(G′l,m[φ]) < 2−m for all φ ∈ Φ .
Indeed, letG′l,m = ∪{Uk | (l,m, k) ∈ A}be the representation ofG′l,m as the union of basic sets,withA recursively enumerable.
Fix temporarily l and m. Set HK := ∪{Uk | (l,m, k) ∈ A, k ≤ K}, so that H1,H2, . . . is a non-decreasing sequence of simple
sets whose union is G′l,m. Remember that, by (27), HK ⊆ G′l,m. We may ‘‘quarantine’’ new HK until they are ‘‘cleared’’, i.e.,
∀φ ∈ Φ : Pφ(HK [φ]) < 2−m (4)
is established. The open set G′′l,m is defined as the union of the HK that are cleared.
Let us check that condition (4) can indeed be eventually established by a computable procedure when it is satisfied.
Suppose (4) is satisfied. The set
S := {φ ∈ Φ | Pφ(HK [φ]) < 2−m}
is effectively open, so that we can effectively generate a sequence of basic setsU ′k ⊆ Φ whose union is S. By the compactness
ofΦ , already a finite number of U ′k will cover S when S = Φ , and so (4) can be established in a computable manner.
Therefore, we can list all tests of randomness, in the following sense: there is a computable sequence (G′′l,m)
∞
m=1, l =
1, 2, . . ., of tests of randomness that contains all ‘‘strict’’ tests of randomness (i.e., those satisfying the required inequality
with ‘‘<’’ instead of ‘‘≤’’; any test of randomness Gm can be made strict by redefining Gm := Gm+1,m = 1, 2, . . .). To obtain
a largest test of randomness Gm, it suffices to set
Gm :=
∞⋃
l=1
G′′l,m+l.
Indeed, the computability of the sequence of open sets Gm is obvious,
Pφ(Gm[φ]) ≤
∞∑
l=1
Pφ(G′′l,m+l[φ]) ≤
∞∑
l=1
2−m−l = 2−m, ∀φ ∈ Φ,∀m ∈ N,
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and, for each l ∈ N,
T (ω, φ) = max{m | (ω, φ) ∈ Gm} ≥ max{m | (ω, φ) ∈ G′′l,m+l} = Tl(ω, φ)− l, ∀(ω, φ) ∈ Ω × Φ,
where T is the functional representation of the test (Gm)∞m=1 and Tl is the functional representation of the test (G
′′
l,m)
∞
m=1. 
Let us fix a largest, to within an additive constant, test of randomness T and call it the universal test of randomness. A
sequence ω ∈ Ω is said to bemeasure-random with respect to φ ∈ Φ if T (ω, φ) <∞.
Definition 3. We say that pi = (p1, y1, p2, y2, . . .) ∈ Π is measure-random if there exists a forecasting system φ such that
(y1, y2, . . .) is measure-randomwith respect to φ and φ agreeswith pi , in the sense that pn = φ(y1, . . . , yn−1) for all n ∈ N.
4. Equivalence of the two notions of randomness
Theorem 1. A sequence pi ∈ Π is game-random if and only if it is measure-random.
This theoremwill be proved in the next section. The proof will be based on Levin’s [18] ideas (see also [12]). A related result
is Theorem 7 in [2], which is technically much simpler but uses a less natural definition.
The philosophical significance of Theorem 1 is that it establishes the equivalence of the purely prequential and Bayesian
viewpoints in the framework of the algorithmic theory of randomness. The definition of measure-randomness is Bayesian,
in that Learner is modelled as a coherent decision maker, computing his forecasts by conditioning a probability measure;
rejecting the forecasts is the same as rejecting all probability measures that could have produced those forecasts. The
definition of game-randomness is purely prequential, in that it does not postulate any probability measures behind the
forecasts; the latter are used for testing directly.
A simple corollary of Theorem 1 is the following observation:
Corollary 1. Let φ be a computable forecasting system such that φ(x) ∈ (0, 1) for all x ∈ Ω. A binary sequence (y1, y2, . . .) is
randomwith respect to Pφ in the sense of Martin-Löf if and only if the sequence (p1, y1, p2, y2, . . .) is game-random (equivalently,
measure-random), where pn := φ(y1, . . . , yn−1), n ∈ N.
Therefore, the prequential notions of game-randomness and measure-randomness generalize Martin-Löf’s notion of
randomness. Corollary 1 generalizes Theorem 10 in [2].
Remark 2. Notice that we have never assumed that the past observations y1, . . . , yn−1 are the only information available
to Learner when choosing the forecast pn for the next outcome yn. Learner is allowed to (and typically does) use all kinds of
‘‘side information’’ in addition to the past observations. It is easy to extend all our definitions and results to the case where
some of this side information, xn, is also known to the gambler. (As in [6], Section 9, and [2].) As an example, the definition
of a farthingale, (1), becomes
V (x1, p1, y1, . . . , xn−1, pn−1, yn−1) = (1− pn)V (x1, p1, y1, . . . , xn−1, pn−1, yn−1, xn, pn, 0)
+ pnV (x1, p1, y1, . . . , xn−1, pn−1, yn−1, xn, pn, 1).
Remark 3. Since we do not record side information in the main part of this paper, the forecasting systems that we consider
are never assumed computable: even if Learner computes each forecast from the past outcomes and the side information,
typically the forecast cannot be computed from thepast outcomes alone. It is not even obvious that the notion of a forecasting
system φ as we defined it (a function of past outcomes) is meaningful outside purely automatic forecasting. It involves
the following scenario of repeated ‘‘local surgeries’’, along the lines of Pearl [25] (Section 6.2). To elicit the value of the
function φ on a binary sequence y1, . . . , yn, we act as follows. First we wait until Reality produces the first piece of side
information x1 and, in response, Learner produces p1. Then we perform a ‘‘local surgery’’ replacing Reality’s outcome by y1
(if it is different from y1). Now Reality produces x2 and Learner produces p2. Another local surgery replaces the outcome
by y2, etc. Finally, Learner produces pn, which is taken to be the value of φ on y1, . . . , yn. Pearl’s approach is sometimes
regarded as philosophically questionable (see, e.g., Section 4 of Pearl’s response in [24]). However, Theorem 1 shows that it
leads to the same notion of prequential randomness (and Theorem2will show that it leads to the same notion of prequential
probability) as the philosophically immaculate approach of Section 2. This can serve as the justification of Pearl’s approach
in the prequential framework.
Remark 4. It is easy to see that Theorem 1 fails if in the definition of measure-typicalness we require that φ should
range over computable forecasting systems. Indeed, take any non-computable sequence (y1, y2, . . .) ∈ Ω and consider
pi := (y1, y1, y2, y2, . . .) as an element of Π . It is clear that pi is game-random (no farthingale can grow on it) but no
computable forecasting system agrees with pi .
5. Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
The proof of the theorem will depend on a fundamental result called Ville’s inequality. Let φ be a forecasting system. A
martingalewith respect to φ is a function V : Ω → [−∞,∞] satisfying
V (x) = (1− φ(x))V (x, 0)+ φ(x)V (x, 1) (5)
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for all x ∈ Ω (with the same convention 0(±∞) := 0). If we replace ‘‘=’’ by ‘‘≥’’ (respectively, by ‘‘≤’’) in (5), we get the
definition of a supermartingale (respectively, submartingale) with respect to φ.
Proposition 1 (Ville’s Inequality, [31], p. 100). If φ is a forecasting system, V is a non-negative supermartingale with respect to
φ with initial value V (Λ) = 1, and C > 0,
Pφ
{
ω ∈ Ω | sup
n
V (ωn) ≥ C
}
≤ 1
C
.
Fix pi ∈ Π .
Part ‘‘if’’ of Theorem 1
Suppose pi is not game-random. Then pi ∈ Gm for allm ∈ N, where
Gm :=
{
pi ∈ Π | sup
n
U(pin) > 2m
}
and U is the universal superfarthingale. For φ ∈ Φ and ω = (y1, y2, . . .) ∈ Ω we set
ωφ := (φ(Λ), y1, φ(y1), y2, φ(y1, y2), y3, . . .) ∈ Π;
similarly, for φ ∈ Φ and x = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Ω we set
xφ := (φ(Λ), y1, φ(y1), y2, . . . , φ(y1, . . . , yn−1), yn) ∈ Π.
The mapping (ω, φ) 7→ ωφ fromΩ × Φ toΠ is continuous. Therefore, the set
G′m :=
{
(ω, φ) | ωφ ∈ Gm
}
is open.
Let us check that G′m is a test of randomness. The computability requirement follows from Lemma 14 (suitably modified;
in particular, made uniform in C) in Appendix. Fix m ∈ N and φ ∈ Φ . To check (3), i.e., Pφ(G′m[φ]) ≤ 2−m in the current
notation, notice that the function Uφ : Ω → [0,∞] defined by
Uφ(x) := U (xφ) , x ∈ Ω, (6)
is a non-negative supermartingale with respect to φ. Now Ville’s inequality implies
Pφ(G′m[φ]) = Pφ
{
ω ∈ Ω | (ω, φ) ∈ G′m
} = Pφ {ω ∈ Ω | ωφ ∈ Gm}
= Pφ
{
ω ∈ Ω | sup
n
Uφ(ωn) > 2m
}
≤ 2−m, ∀φ ∈ Φ.
Suppose pi , assumed to be not game-random, is measure-random. Then there exists φ ∈ Φ such that pi = ωφ for some
ω measure-random with respect to φ. Since pi ∈ Gm, we have (ω, φ) ∈ G′m; since this is true for each m ∈ N, ω is not
measure-random with respect to φ, and so we have arrived at a contradiction.
Part ‘‘only if’’ of Theorem 1
Let Gm = ∪{Uk | (m, k) ∈ A} be a representation of the universal test of randomness via basic sets, with A ⊆ N2 a
recursively enumerable set. Without loss of generality we can assume that each basic set Uk in this representation has the
form Γc ×
{
φ ∈ Φ | a(x) < φ(x) < b(x),∀x ∈ Ω≤n} for some c ∈ Ωn, a, b : Ω≤n → Q, and n ∈ N. Define G′m to be the set
of all (p1, y1, p2, y2, . . .) ∈ Π such that ((y1, y2, . . .), φ) ∈ Gm for all φ that agree with (p1, y1, p2, y2, . . .).
The compactness of Φ easily implies that each set G′m ⊆ Π is open. Indeed, suppose pi = (p1, y1, p2, y2, . . .) ∈ G′m. For
each φ ∈ Φ , either φ disagrees with pi or ((y1, y2, . . .), φ) ∈ Gm. In both cases there is a neighbourhood O′φ of pi and a
neighbourhood O′′φ of φ such that either all elements of O′′φ disagree with all elements of O′φ or ((y′1, y
′
2, . . .), φ
′) ∈ Gm for all
(p′1, y
′
1, p
′
2, y
′
2, . . .) ∈ O′φ and all φ′ ∈ O′′φ . Since Φ is compact, there is a finite set φ1, . . . , φJ such that
⋃J
j=1 O
′′
φj
= Φ . We
can see that the neighbourhood
⋂J
j=1 O
′
φj
of pi is a subset of G′m.
Essentially the same argument shows that the G′m form a computable sequence of open sets. Let us show that there exists
a non-negative superfarthingale Vm with initial value 2−m or less that eventually exceeds 1 on each sequence in G′m. (In this
sense G′m form a prequential test of randomness.)
Let G′m = ∪{Uk | (m, k) ∈ A} be a representation of G′m via basic sets, where A ⊆ N2 is a recursively enumerable set. Let
A = ⋃∞i=1 Ai be a representation of A as the union of a computable nested sequence ∅ ⊂ A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ · · · of finite sets. Fix
an m. For each i ∈ N, define a superfarthingaleWi as follows. Let N be so large that, for all x ∈ ΠN and (m, k) ∈ Ai, either
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Γx ⊆ Uk or Γx ∩ Uk = ∅. (For example, we can set N to the largest nk in (26) over k such that (m, k) ∈ Ai.) For n ≥ N and
x ∈ Πn, set
Wi(x) :=
{
1 if Γx ⊆ Uk for some kwith (m, k) ∈ Ai
0 otherwise.
After that proceed by backward induction. IfWi(x) is already defined for x ∈ Πn, n = N,N−1, . . . , 1, set, for each x ∈ Πn−1,
Wi(x) := sup
p∈[0,1]
(
(1− p)Wi(x, p, 0)+ pWi(x, p, 1)
)
. (7)
It is clear thatWi is a superfarthingale that does not depend on the choice of N .
We will need to establish several properties ofWi. First, it is lower semicontinuous. Indeed, there is an N (e.g., the largest
nk in (26) over (m, k) ∈ Ai) such thatWi(x) is lower semicontinuous when x is restricted toΠn with n ≥ N . (It will be even
lower semicomputable when x is restricted toΠ≥N .) And the operation sup preserves lower semicontinuity:
Lemma 4. If a function f : X × Y → R defined on the product of topological spaces X and Y is lower semicontinuous, then the
function x ∈ X 7→ g(x) := supy∈Y f (x, y) is also lower semicontinuous.
Proof. It suffices to notice that, for each c ∈ R, {x | g(x) > c} = {x | ∃y : f (x, y) > c}, and projections of open sets are
open. 
The lower semicontinuity ofWi implies its lower semicomputability: indeed, we can restrict p to Q ∩ [0, 1] in (7).
Let us check that Wi(Λ) ≤ 2−m. Suppose that, on the contrary, Wi(Λ) > 2−m. Construct a forecasting system φ as
follows. (The words such as ‘‘construct’’ and ‘‘choose’’ are not intended to imply computability: there are no computability
restrictions in this paragraph.) For each x ∈ Ωn, n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1, choose φ(x) such that
(1− φ(x))Wi(xφ, φ(x), 0)+ φ(x)Wi(xφ, φ(x), 1)
≥ sup
p∈[0,1]
(
(1− p)Wi(xφ, p, 0)+ pWi(xφ, p, 1)
)− /N = Wi(xφ)− /N,
where  > 0 satisfiesWi(Λ) > 2−m + . For each x ∈ Ω≥N , define φ(x) arbitrarily, say φ(x) := 0. Since ωφ /∈ G′m for all
ω /∈ Gm[φ], we haveWφi (ωN) = 0 for all ω /∈ Gm[φ]. Combining the fact that{
ω | Wφi (ωN) = 1
}
⊆ Gm[φ]
with the fact that the function x ∈ Ω 7→ S(x) := Wφi (x)+ n/N , where n is the length of x, is a submartingale with respect
to φ, we obtain
Pφ(Gm[φ]) ≥ Pφ
{
ω | Wφi (ωN) = 1
}
= EφWφi (ωN) = Eφ(S(ωN)− )
≥ S(Λ)−  = Wφi (Λ)−  = Wi(Λ)−  > 2−m, (8)
where Eφ stands for the expectation of a function of ω ∈ Ω with respect to Pφ . The inequality between the extreme terms
of (8) fails by the definition of a test of randomness.
Define Vm(x) := supiWi(x), x ∈ Π, to be the limit of the non-decreasing sequence of superfarthingalesWi. It is clear
that Vm is also a superfarthingale (even satisfying
Vm(x) = sup
p∈[0,1]
(
(1− p)Vm(x, p, 0)+ pVm(x, p, 1)
)
,
according to (7)) and Vm(Λ) ≤ 2−m. Set V :=∑∞m=1 Vm; this is a lower semicomputable superfarthingale with initial value
V (Λ) ≤ 1 (so that V ∈ V if we redefine V (Λ) := 1).
Now it is easy to finish the proof of the theorem. Suppose that pi is not measure-random. Then pi ∈ G′m for all m ∈ N.
Then V (pin)→∞ as n→∞, and so pi is not game-random.
Corollary 1
Fix a sequence ω = (y1, y2, . . .) ∈ Ω , and set pi := ωφ ∈ Π . We will prove the equivalence of the game-randomness
of pi and Schnorr and Levin’s reformulation of Martin-Löf randomness of ω with respect to Pφ . Remember that Schnorr
and Levin’s reformulation is that the universal lower semicomputable supermartingale with respect to φ is bounded on ωn,
n→∞; we will refer to this property as the Schnorr–Levin randomness of ω with respect to φ.
Suppose pi is not game-random. Then U(pin) → ∞ as n → ∞, where U is the universal superfarthingale. Then
Uφ(ωn)→∞, and since Uφ is a lower semicomputable supermartingale with respect to φ, ω is not Schnorr–Levin random.
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Now suppose ω is not Schnorr–Levin random with respect to φ. Let S be the universal lower semicomputable
supermartingale with respect to φ. We can transform S into a superfarthingale V by multiplying it by the likelihood ratio:
V (p1, y1, . . . , pn, yn) := S(y1, . . . , yn) Pφ(Γ(y1,...,yn))n∏
i=1
|pi + yi − 1|
(the expression |pi + yi − 1| is just a convenient code for the probability assigned by Learner outputting forecast pi to the
outcome yi: it is pi if yi = 1, and it is 1− pi if yi = 0). Since V (pin) = S(ωn)→∞ as n→∞, pi is not game-random.
Our argument depends on the superfarthingale V being lower semicomputable. The lower semicomputability of V is
easy to check once we finish its definition for the boundary cases. We set V (p1, y1, . . . , pn, yn) := 0when S(y1, . . . , yn) = 0
(although this case is in fact impossible since S is the universal supermartingale), and we set V (p1, y1, . . . , pn, yn) := ∞
when S(y1, . . . , yn) > 0 but
∏n
i=1 |pi + yi − 1| = 0. By the assumption ∀x ∈ Ω : φ(x) ∈ (0, 1)made in the statement of
Corollary 1, we have Pφ(Γ(y1,...,yn)) > 0. It is an open problem to get rid of this assumption or show that it is essential. (If it
turns out to be essential, the next open problem iswhether it can be relaxed to the assumption that the setφ−1({0, 1}) ⊆ Ω
is computable.)
6. Prequential probability
In this sectionwewill discuss a question that does not involve the notion of computability but still is closely connected, at
least at a philosophical level, to Theorem 1.We have seen that in the prequential framework the notion of randomness splits
into game-randomness and measure-randomness. We will see that, in a similar way, the notion of probability splits into
game-theoretic probability and measure-theoretic probability. The argument given in the proof of Theorem 1, stating the
equivalence of game-randomness andmeasure-randomness, shows that game-theoretic andmeasure-theoretic probability
coincide on the open sets. The proof of this result will be spelled out explicitly without reference to the proof of Theorem 1:
see the proof of Proposition 3 below. This leaves the question of whether game-theoretic andmeasure-theoretic probability
coincide for wider classes of sets. Theorem 2 below states that they indeed coincide on the Borel, and even analytic, sets.
6.1. Measure-theoretic and game-theoretic probability
Let E be a prequential event, i.e., a subset of Π . We will define two notions of probability of E, denoted by Pmeas(E)
(measure-theoretic) and Pgame(E) (game-theoretic).
Measure-theoretic probability, as formalized by Kolmogorov [16], is standard. In our context, its object of study is the
probability measures P onΩ , which we usually represent in the form P = Pφ with φ a forecasting system. We can apply it
to prequential events as follows, in the spirit of [13], Section 10.2. We define the upper measure-probability of E as
Pmeas(E) := sup
φ
Pφ(Eφ),
where
Eφ := {ω ∈ Ω | ωφ ∈ E}.
The expression Pφ(Eφ) in the definition of Pmeas(E) is well defined if E is a Borel set: since ωφ is a continuous function of ω,
the set {ω | ωφ ∈ E} is also Borel. If E is not Borel, Pφ(Eφ) is understood to be the outer measure of Eφ with respect to Pφ .
The game-theoretic approach to probability is as old as measure-theoretic (see, e.g., [23,31]) but game-theoretic
probability was formalized only recently [32,8,29]. Game-theoretic probability can be introduced as either upper or lower
probability; in this paper the former is more convenient. The upper game-probability of a prequential event E is
Pgame(E) := inf
{
 : ∃V : V (Λ) =  and ∀pi ∈ E : lim sup
n
V (pin) ≥ 1
}
, (9)
where V ranges over the non-negative farthingales. It is clear that nothing changes if lim sup is replaced by sup or lim inf
(we can always stop when 1 is reached) and/or if we allow V to range over the non-negative superfarthingales.
Note that upper game-probability is not additive: e.g., both an event and its complement can have upper probability 1.
However, it is sub-additive: the upper game-probability of E1 ∪ E2 does not exceed the sum of the upper game-probabilities
of E1 and E2. The following lemma says that this is also true for countable unions.
Lemma 5. For any sequence E1, E2, . . . of prequential events,
Pgame
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ei
)
≤
∞∑
i=1
Pgame(Ei).
In particular, if Pgame(Ei) = 0 for all i, then Pgame(⋃∞i=1 Ei) = 0.
Proof. It suffices to notice that the sum of a sequence of non-negative farthingales is again a non-negative farthingale. 
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Therefore, upper game-probability is an outer measure. The lower game-probability of E is defined as
Pgame(E) := 1− Pgame(Ec),
where Ec is the complement of E. The exact game-probability of E exists if Pgame(E) = Pgame(E) and is equal to this common
value. (Exact game-probability exists for interesting events only in the case of continuous time, as in [33]; in the discrete-
time framework of this paper there are many important events for which lower game-probability is close to upper game-
probability: see, e.g., [29].) In the rest of this paper we will consider only upper probabilities.
The two notions of probability give two informal notions of randomness that parallel measure-randomness and game-
randomness. Namely, Cournot’s principle, which is often regarded as the basis for all applications of probability (see, e.g.,
[28]), can be stated, in our context, as follows: a data sequence is not random if it belongs to a pre-specified event of small
upper probability. In the case of game-theoretic probability, a data sequence pi ∈ Π is regarded as not random if a pre-
specified non-negative farthingale starting from 1 becomes large on pi . In the case of measure-theoretic probability, a data
sequence pi ∈ Π is regarded as not random if it belongs to a pre-specified critical region E whose probability Pφ(Eφ) is
small under any forecasting system φ. The coincidence of the two notions of randomness suggests the coincidence of the
two notions of probability.
6.2. Coincidence of the two notions of probability
First we prove a simple result showing that upper measure-probability is always less than or equal to upper game-
probability.
Proposition 2. For any set E ⊆ Π , it is true that Pmeas(E) ≤ Pgame(E).
Proof. Fix E ⊆ Π . It suffices to prove that Pφ(Eφ) ≤ U(Λ) for any forecasting system φ and any non-negative farthingale U
satisfying lim supn U(pin) ≥ 1 for all pi ∈ E. Fix such φ and U . Then Uφ (in the notation of (6)) is a non-negative martingale
with respect to φ satisfying lim supn Uφ(ωn) ≥ 1 for all ω ∈ Eφ . Applying Proposition 1 to V := U/U(Λ) and C := 1/U(Λ),
we can see that indeed Pφ(Eφ) ≤ U(Λ). 
Notice that Proposition 2 holds despite the absence of the requirement of measurability of the (super)farthingale V in (9)
(cf. the discussion in [29], pp. 168–169). Even if V is not measurable, V φ is always measurable (any function onΩ is).
A simple modification of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that the following result is true.
Proposition 3. If E ⊆ Π is an open set, Pmeas(E) = Pgame(E).
Proof. Fix an open set E ⊆ Π . The idea of the proof is to construct the smallest non-negative superfarthingale (denoted by
W below) such that lim supnW (pin) ≥ 1 for all pi ∈ E.
Represent E as the union E =⋃∞i=1 Ei of a nested sequence E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ · · · of open sets such that each Ei satisfies
∀pi ∈ Π : pi ∈ Ei H⇒ Γpi i ⊆ Ei (10)
(informally, Ei is a property of the first i forecasts and outcomes). For each i = 1, 2, . . ., define a superfarthingale Wi as
follows. For all x ∈ Π≥i, set
Wi(x) :=
{
1 if Γx ⊆ Ei
0 otherwise.
(11)
The rest of the definition is inductive. If Wi(x) is already defined for x ∈ Πn, n = i, i − 1, . . . , 1, define Wi(x), for each
x ∈ Πn−1, by (7).
To prove the inequality Pmeas(E) ≥ Pgame(E) (this is all we need to do, in view of Proposition 2), let us first check that
Wi(Λ) ≤ Pmeas(E). Suppose that, on the contrary,Wi(Λ) > Pmeas(E). Construct a forecasting system φ as follows. For each
x ∈ Ωn, n = 0, 1, . . . , i− 1, choose φ(x) such that
(1− φ(x))Wi(xφ, φ(x), 0)+ φ(x)Wi(xφ, φ(x), 1)
≥ sup
p∈[0,1]
(
(1− p)Wi(xφ, p, 0)+ pWi(xφ, p, 1)
)− /i = Wi(xφ)− /i,
where  > 0 satisfiesWi(Λ) > Pmeas(E) + . For each x ∈ Ω≥i, set, e.g., φ(x) := 0. Since the function x ∈ Ω 7→ S(x) :=
Wφi (x)+ n/i, where n is the length of x, is a submartingale with respect to φ, we have
Pmeas(E) ≥ Pφ(Eφ) ≥ Pφ(Eφi )
= Pφ
{
ω | Wφi (ωi) = 1
}
= EφWφi (ωi) = Eφ(S(ωi)− )
≥ S(Λ)−  = Wφi (Λ)−  = Wi(Λ)−  > Pmeas(E),
a contradiction.
SettingW := supiWi, we obtain a non-negative superfarthingale satisfyingW (Λ) ≤ Pmeas(E) and lim supnW (pin) ≥ 1
for all pi ∈ E. Therefore, Pgame(E) ≤ Pmeas(E). 
It turns out that the two notions of prequential probability coincide on all analytic sets (this is a wide class containing,
e.g., all Borel sets; a precise definition can be found in, e.g., [14]).
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Theorem 2. If E ⊆ Π is an analytic set, Pmeas(E) = Pgame(E).
This is the second main result of this paper. We will prove it in the next section. This result contains Proposition 3 as a
special case. We give an independent proof of Proposition 3 since it is muchmore constructive than the proof of the general
statement.
7. Proof of Theorem 2
The inequality≤ in Theorem 2 immediately follows from Proposition 2, and so it suffices to prove the inequality≥.
We start from proving a special case of Theorem 2.
Lemma 6. If E ⊆ Π is a compact set, Pmeas(E) = Pgame(E).
Proof. Fix a compact prequential event E ⊆ Π . (Of course, ‘‘compact’’ is the same thing as ‘‘closed’’ in this context.)
Represent E as the intersection E = ⋂∞i=1 Ei of a nested sequence E1 ⊇ E2 ⊇ · · · of closed sets such that (10) is satisfied for
all i. For each i = 1, 2, . . ., define a superfarthingaleWi by setting (11) for all x ∈ Π≥i and then proceeding inductively as
follows. IfWi(x) is already defined for x ∈ Πn, n = i, i − 1, . . . , 1, defineWi(x), for each x ∈ Πn−1, by (7). It is clear that
W1 ≥ W2 ≥ · · ·.
Let us check thatWi(x) is upper semicontinuous as a function of x ∈ Π. By (11) this is true for x ∈ Π≥i. Suppose this
is true for x ∈ Πn, n ∈ {i, i− 1, . . . , 2}, and let us prove that it is true for x ∈ Πn−1, using the inductive definition (7). It is
clear that f (x, p) := (1− p)Wi(x, p, 0)+ pWi(x, p, 1) is upper semicontinuous as function of p ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ Πn−1. It is
well known that supp f (x, p) is upper semicontinuous whenever f is upper semicontinuous and x and p range over compact
sets (see, e.g., [9], Theorem I.2(d); a simple proof of a slightly more general fact will be given below in Lemma 7). Therefore,
Wi(x) = supp∈[0,1] f (x, p) is an upper semicontinuous function of x ∈ Πn−1.
An important implication of the upper semicontinuity ofWi and the compactness of [0, 1] is that the supremum in (7) is
attained: it is easy to check that an upper semicontinuous function attains its supremumover a compact set (cf. [10], Problem
3.12.23(g)). For each i = 1, 2, . . ., we can now define a forecasting system φi as follows. For each x ∈ Ωn, n = 0, 1, . . . , i−1,
choose φi(x) such that
(1− φi(x))Wi(xφi , φi(x), 0)+ φi(x)Wi(xφi , φi(x), 1) = sup
p
(
(1− p)Wi(xφi , p, 0)+ pWi(xφi , p, 1)
) = Wi(xφi)
(this is an inductive definition; in particular, xφi is already defined at the time of definingφi(x)). For x ∈ Ω≥i, set, for example,
φi(x) := 0. SinceWφii is a martingale with respect to φi, we have Pφi(Eφii ) = Wi(Λ).
Since the set Φ of all forecasting systems is compact in the product topology, the sequence φi has a convergent
subsequence φik , k = 1, 2, . . .; let φ := limk→∞ φik . We assume, without loss of generality, i1 < i2 < · · ·. Set
c := inf
i
Wi(Λ) = lim
i→∞Wi(Λ).
Fix an arbitrarily small  > 0. Let us prove that Pφ(Eφ) ≥ c − . Let K ∈ N. The restriction of Pφik to Ω iK (more formally,
the probability measure assigning weight Pφik (Γx) to each singleton {x}, x ∈ Ω iK ) comes within  of the restriction of Pφ to
Ω iK in total variation distance from some k on; let the total variation distance be at most  for all k ≥ K ′ ≥ K . Let k ≥ K ′.
Since Pφik (E
φik
ik
) ≥ c , it is also true that Pφik (E
φik
iK
) ≥ c; therefore, it is true that Pφ(EφikiK ) ≥ c − . By Fatou’s lemma, we now
obtain
Pφ
(
lim sup
k
E
φik
iK
)
≥ lim sup
k→∞
Pφ(E
φik
iK
) ≥ c − . (12)
Let us check that
lim sup
k
E
φik
iK
⊆ EφiK . (13)
Indeed, let ω /∈ EφiK , i.e., ωφ /∈ EiK . Since φik → φ in the product topology and the set EiK is closed, ωφik /∈ EiK from some k
on. This means that ω ∈ EφikiK for only finitely many k, i.e., ω /∈ lim supk E
φik
iK
.
From (12) and (13) we can see that Pφ(E
φ
iK
) ≥ c − , for all K ∈ N. This implies Pφ(Eφ) ≥ c − . Since this holds for all ,
Pφ(Eφ) ≥ c.
The rest of the proof is easy: since
Pgame(E) ≤ c ≤ Pφ(Eφ) ≤ Pmeas(E) ≤ Pgame(E)
(the last inequality following from Proposition 2), we have
Pgame(E) = c = Pφ(Eφ) = Pmeas(E). 
In the proof of Lemma 6 we referred to the following analogue of Lemma 4.
Lemma 7. Suppose X and Y are topological spaces and Y is compact. If a function f : X × Y → R is upper semicontinuous, then
the function x ∈ X 7→ g(x) := supy∈Y f (x, y) is also upper semicontinuous.
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Proof. For any c ∈ R, we are required to show that the set G := {x | supy f (x, y) < c} is open. Let x ∈ G. For any y ∈ Y
there exists a neighbourhood O′y of x and a neighbourhood O′′y of y such that, for some  > 0, f (x′, y′) < c −  for all x′ ∈ O′y
and all y′ ∈ O′′y . By the compactness of Y , there is a finite family O′′y1 , . . . ,O′′yK that covers Y . The intersection of O′y1 , . . . ,O′yK
will contain x and will be a subset of G. Therefore, G is indeed open. 
The argument in [9], proof of Theorem I.2(d), is even simpler, but it assumes that X is compact (which is, however,
sufficient for the purpose of Lemma 6).
The idea of the proof of Theorem 2 is to extend Lemma 6 to the analytic sets using Choquet’s capacitability theorem
(stated below). Remember that a function γ (such as Pgame or Pmeas) mapping the power set of a topological space X (such
asΠ ) to [0,∞) is a capacity (on X) if:
• for any subsets A and B of X ,
A ⊆ B H⇒ γ (A) ≤ γ (B); (14)
• for any nested increasing sequence A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ · · · of arbitrary subsets of X ,
γ
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
= lim
i→∞ γ (Ai); (15)
• for any nested decreasing sequence K1 ⊇ K2 ⊇ · · · of compact sets in X ,
γ
( ∞⋂
i=1
Ki
)
= lim
i→∞ γ (Ki). (16)
Condition (16) is sometimes replaced by a different condition which is equivalent to (16) for compact metrizable spaces X:
cf. [14], Definition 30.1.
It turns out that both Pgame and Pmeas are capacities. We start from Pgame.
Theorem 3. The set function Pgame is a capacity.
It is obvious that Pgame satisfies condition (14). The following two statements establish conditions (15) and (16). Condition
(16) is easier to check: it can be extracted from the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 8. If K1 ⊇ K2 ⊇ · · · is a nested sequence of compact sets inΠ ,
Pgame
( ∞⋂
i=1
Ki
)
= lim
i→∞ P
game(Ki). (17)
Proof. Wewill use the equality Pgame(E) = limi→∞ Pgame(Ei), in the notation of the proof of Lemma 6. This equality follows
from
Pgame(E) = c = lim
i→∞Wi(Λ) ≥ limi→∞ P
game(Ei)
(the opposite inequality is obvious).
Represent each Kn in the form Kn =⋂∞i=1 Ei where E1 ⊇ E2 ⊇ · · · and each Ei satisfies (10); we will write Kn,i in place of
Ei. Without loss of generality we will assume that K1,i ⊇ K2,i ⊇ · · · for all i. Then the set K :=⋂∞i=1 Ki can be represented as
K =⋂∞i=1 Ki,i, and so (17) follows from
Pgame(K) = Pgame
( ∞⋂
i=1
Ki,i
)
= lim
i→∞ P
game(Ki,i) = lim
n→∞ limi→∞ P
game(Kn,i)
= lim
n→∞ P
game
( ∞⋂
i=1
Kn,i
)
= lim
n→∞ P
game(Kn). 
To check condition (15) for Pgame, we will need the game-theoretic version, proved in [30], of Lévy’s zero-one law ([20],
Section 41). For each x ∈ Π, define the conditional upper game-probability of E ⊆ Π by
Pgame(E | x) := inf
{
 | ∃V : V (x) =  and ∀pi ∈ E ∩ Γx : lim sup
n
V (pin) ≥ 1
}
,
where V ranges over the non-negative (super)farthingales.
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Proposition 4 ([30]). Let E ⊆ Π . For almost all pi ∈ E,
Pgame(E | pin)→ 1 (18)
as n→∞. (In the sense that there exists a prequential event N such that Pgame(N) = 0 and (18) holds for all pi ∈ E \ N.)
Proof. Without loss of generality we replace (18) by
lim inf
n→∞ P
game(E | pin) ≥ a, (19)
where a ∈ (0, 1) is a given rational number. (Indeed, by Lemma 5, if (19) holds for almost all pi ∈ E for each rational
a ∈ (0, 1), the intersection of (19) over all such a also holds for almost all pi ∈ E, and so (18) holds for almost all pi ∈ E as
well.) It suffices to construct a non-negative farthingale V starting from 1 that tends to∞ on the sequences pi ∈ E for which
(19) is not true.
Let pi be any sequence inΠ ; we will define V (pin) by induction for n = 1, 2, . . . (intuitively, we will describe a gambling
strategy with capital process V ). Start with 1 monetary unit: V (Λ) := 1. Keep setting V (pin) := 1, n = 1, 2, . . ., until
Pgame(E | pin) < a (if this never happens,V (pin)will be 1 for all n). LetN1 be the first nwhen this happens:Pgame(E | piN1) < a
but Pgame(E | pin) ≥ a for all n < N1. Choose a non-negative farthingale S1 starting at piN1 from 1, S1(piN1) = 1, whose upper
limit exceeds 1/a on all extensions of piN1 in E. Keep setting V (pin) := S1(pin), n = N1,N1 + 1, . . ., until S1(pin) reaches a
value s1 > 1/a. After that keep setting V (pin) := V (pin−1) until Pgame(E | pin) < a. Let N2 be the first nwhen this happens.
Choose a non-negative farthingale S2 starting at piN2 from s1, S2(piN2) = s1, whose upper limit exceeds s1/a on all extensions
of piN2 in E. Keep setting V (pin) := S2(pin), n = N2,N2 + 1, . . ., until S2(pin) reaches a value s2 > s1(1/a) > (1/a)2. After
that keep setting V (pin) := V (pin−1) until Pgame(E | pin) < a. Let N3 be the first n when this happens. Choose a non-
negative farthingale S3 starting at piN3 from s2 whose upper limit exceeds s2/a on all extensions of piN3 in E. Keep setting
V (pin) := S3(pin), n = N3,N3 + 1, . . ., until S3 reaches a value s3 > s2(1/a) > (1/a)3. And so on. 
Lemma 9. If A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Π is a nested sequence of prequential events,
Pgame
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
= lim
i→∞ P
game(Ai). (20)
Proof. Let A1, A2, . . . be a nested increasing sequence of prequential events. The non-trivial inequality in (20) is≤. For each
Ai the process
Si(x) := Pgame(Ai | x)
is a non-negative superfarthingale (see Lemma 10 below). By Proposition 4, lim supn Si(pin) ≥ 1 for almost all pi ∈ Ai. The
sequence Si is increasing, S1 ≤ S2 ≤ · · ·, so the limit S := limi→∞ Si = supi Si exists and is a non-negative superfarthingale
such that S(Λ) = limi→∞ Pgame(Ai) and lim supn S(pin) ≥ 1 for almost all pi ∈
⋃
i Ai (by Lemma 5). We can get rid of
‘‘almost’’ by adding to S a non-negative farthingale V that starts at V (Λ) < , for an arbitrarily small  > 0, and satisfies
lim supn V (pin) ≥ 1 for all pi ∈
⋃
i Ai violating lim supn S(pi
n) ≥ 1. 
Lemma 10. For any prequential event E, the function x ∈ Π 7→ Pgame(E | x) is a superfarthingale.
Proof. Suppose there are x ∈ Π and p ∈ [0, 1] such that
Pgame(E | x) < (1− p)Pgame(E | x, p, 0)+ pPgame(E | x, p, 1).
Then there exists a non-negative farthingale V with lim supn V (pin) ≥ 1 for all pi ∈ E ∩ Γx that satisfies
V (x) < (1− p)Pgame(E | x, p, 0)+ pPgame(E | x, p, 1)
and, therefore,
(1− p)V (x, p, 0)+ pV (x, p, 1) < (1− p)Pgame(E | x, p, 0)+ pPgame(E | x, p, 1).
The last inequality implies that there exists j ∈ {0, 1} such that V (x, p, j) < Pgame(E | x, p, j), which is impossible. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 3. Let us now check that upper measure-probability is also a capacity.
Lemma 11. The set function Pmeas is a capacity.
Proof. Property (14) is obvious for Pmeas. Property (16) follows from Lemmas 6 and 8.
Let us now check the remaining property (15), with Pmeas as γ . Suppose there exists an increasing sequence A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆
· · · ⊆ X of prequential events such that
Pmeas
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
> lim
i→∞ P
meas(Ai).
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Let φ be a forecasting system satisfying
Pφ
( ∞⋃
i=1
Aφi
)
> lim
i→∞ P
meas(Ai).
Then φ will satisfy Pφ
(⋃∞
i=1 A
φ
i
)
> limi→∞ Pφ(A
φ
i ), which contradicts Pφ being a capacity (see, e.g., [14], Exercise 30.3). 
In combination with Choquet’s capacitability theorem, Theorem 3 and Lemma 11 allow us to finish the proof of
Theorem 2.
Theorem 4 (Choquet’s Capacitability Theorem, [3]). If X is a compact metrizable space, γ is a capacity on X, and E ⊆ X is an
analytic set,
γ (E) = sup {γ (K) | K is compact, K ⊆ E} .
For a proof of Choquet’s theorem, see, e.g., [14], Theorem 30.13.
Proof of Theorem 2. Combining Choquet’s capacitability theorem (applied to the compact metrizable spaceΠ ), Lemma 6,
Theorem 3, and Lemma 11, we obtain
Pmeas(E) = sup
K⊆E
Pmeas(K) = sup
K⊆E
Pgame(K) = Pgame(E),
K ranging over the compact sets inΠ . 
Remark 5. The fact that upper game-probability and uppermeasure-probability are capacities has allowed us to prove their
coincidence on the analytic sets, and it might be useful for other purposes as well. In general, neither of these capacities is
strongly subadditive, in the sense of satisfying
γ (A ∪ B)+ γ (A ∩ B) ≤ γ (A)+ γ (B)
for all prequential events A and B. To demonstrate this it suffices, in view of Theorem 2, to find analytic sets A and B that
violate
Pgame(A ∪ B)+ Pgame(A ∩ B) ≤ Pgame(A)+ Pgame(B). (21)
We can define Pgame(E) for subsets E of Πn by (9) with lim supn omitted. This is an example of subsets A and B of Π2 for
which (21) is violated:
A =
{(
0, 0,
1
2
, 0
)
,
(
1
2
, 0, 0, 0
)}
, (22)
B =
{(
0, 0,
1
2
, 0
)
,
(
1
2
, 1, 0, 0
)}
. (23)
For these subsets we have
Pgame(A ∪ B)+ Pgame(A ∩ B) = 1+ 1
2
>
1
2
+ 1
2
= Pgame(A)+ Pgame(B).
To obtain an example of subsets A and B of the full prequential spaceΠ for which (21) is violated, it suffices to add 00 . . . at
the end of each element of the sets A and B defined by (22) and (23).
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Appendix. Effective topology
In this section we will give definitions of various notions connected with computability in topological spaces, mainly
following Martin-Löf [22] (see also [12], Appendix C.2). The details of the definitions become important only in the proofs.
We will use the terminology of Engelking [10].
An effective topological space is a second-countable topological space with a fixed numbering (Uk)∞k=1 of its countable
base. In other words, an effective topological space is a triple (X,O, (Uk)∞k=1), where (X,O) is a topological space and
(Uk)∞k=1 is a numbering of its countable base. The family (Uk)
∞
k=1 is called the effective base of the effective topological space,
and its elements are called basic sets. Finite unions of basic sets are called simple sets. We do not distinguish between two
effective topological spaces (X,O, (Uk)∞k=1) and (X ′,O′, (U
′
k)
∞
k=1) if (X,O) = (X ′,O′) and there exists a computable bijection
f : N→ N such that U ′k = Uf (k) for all k.
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Example 1 (N). The usual discrete topology on N has as its base the set of all singletons {k}, k ∈ N. They can serve as the
effective base, Uk := {k}.
Example 2 (R). The topology onR has as its base the set of all intervals (a, b), a < b. TomakeR into an effective topological
space, fix a computable enumeration (ak, bk), k = 1, 2, . . ., of all intervals with rational end-points, and take Uk := (ak, bk)
as the effective base.
Example 3 (Ω). The topology onΩ := {0, 1}∞ is the usual product topology, whichmakesΩ a compact topological space.
To make it into an effective topological space, fix a computable bijection f : N→ Ω and take Uk := Γf (k) as the effective
base.
Example 4 (Φ). The basic sets inΦ (the set of all forecasting systems) have the form{
φ ∈ Φ | a(x) < φ(x) < b(x),∀x ∈ Ω≤n} (24)
for some n ∈ N and a, b : Ω≤n → Q. Let (nk, ak, bk), k = 1, 2, . . ., be a computable enumeration of all such triples (n, a, b).
Set Uk to (24) with (n, a, b) := (nk, ak, bk).
Example 5 (Π ). The topology on the prequential space Π is the standard product topology of [0, 1] × {0, 1} × [0, 1] ×
{0, 1} × · · ·. The basic sets are{
(p1, y1, p2, y2, . . .) ∈ Π | a1 < p1 < b1, y1 = c1, . . . , an < pn < bn, yn = cn
}
(25)
where n ranges over N, ai, bi ∈ Q, and ci ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , n. Let
(nk, a1,k, b1,k, c1,k, . . . , ank,k, bnk,k, cnk,k) (26)
be a computable enumeration of all such sequences (n, a1, b1, c1, . . . , an, bn, cn). We can define Uk as (25) with (26) in place
of (n, a1, b1, c1, . . . , an, bn, cn).
Let X ′ and X ′′ be two effective topological spaces with effective bases (U ′k)
∞
k=1 and (U
′′
k )
∞
k=1, respectively. The Cartesian
product of X ′ and X ′′ is the product of the topological spaces X ′ and X ′′ equipped with the effective base (Uk)∞k=1, where
Uf (k′,k′′) := U ′k′ × U ′′k′′ and f : N2 → N is a fixed computable bijection. We will be particularly interested in the product
Ω × Φ; sometimes we will need products of more than two spaces, such asΩ × Φ × R := (Ω × Φ)× R.
Let X be an effective topological space with effective base (Uk)∞k=1. As described in the previous paragraph, we define the
structure of an effective topological space on the power set Xn, n ∈ N; let the effective base in Xn be (U (n)k )∞k=1. For n = 0, X0
is the trivial one-element effective topological space with all Uk = X0, k ∈ N. The set X∗ of all finite sequences of elements
of X is equipped with the topology of the direct sum of Xn, n ≥ 0. An effective base in it can be defined by Uf (n,k) := U (n)k ,
where f : (N ∪ {0})× N→ N is a computable bijection.
Let X be a fixed effective topological space with effective base (Uk)∞k=1. An open set G ⊆ X is said to be effectively open if
it can be represented in the form G = ∪{Uk | k ∈ A} for a recursively enumerable set A ⊆ N. In the main part of this paper,
for any effectively open set Gwe restrict ourselves only to its representations ∪{Uk | k ∈ A} such that
Uk ⊆ G; (27)
this can be done without loss of generality for all specific effective topological spaces that we need. A computable sequence
of open sets is a sequence of open sets G1,G2, . . . such that there exists a recursively enumerable set A ⊆ N2 satisfying
Gm = ∪{Uk | (m, k) ∈ A} for allm ∈ N. A computable family of sequences of open sets is a family (Gl,m), l,m ∈ N, of sequences
of open sets such that there exists a recursively enumerable set A ⊆ N3 satisfying Gl,m = ∪{Uk | (l,m, k) ∈ A} for all l,m.
The existence of a universal Turing machine immediately implies
Lemma 12. There exists a computable family (Gl,m) of sequences of open sets such that for any computable sequence G′m of open
sets there exists l ∈ N such that G′m = Gl,m for all m ∈ N.
Any computable family of sequences of open sets satisfying the condition in Lemma 12 will be called a universal computable
family of sequences of open sets.
A function f : X → R ∪ {∞} is called lower semicomputable if the set {(x, r) | x ∈ X, r ∈ R, f (x) > r} is effectively open
in X × R. Similarly, a function f : X → N0 is lower semicomputable if the set {(x, r) | x ∈ X, r ∈ N, f (x) ≥ r} is effectively
open in X × N. A sequence f1, f2, . . . of lower semicomputable functions fl : X → R ∪ {∞} is called computable if the set
{(l, x, r) | x ∈ X, r ∈ R, fl(x) > r} is effectively open inN×X ×R. The existence of a universal Turing machine also implies
Lemma 13. There exists a computable sequence f1, f2, . . . of lower semicomputable functions fl : X → [0,∞] that contains
every lower semicomputable function f : X → [0,∞].
Any computable sequence of lower semicomputable functions satisfying the condition in Lemma 13will be called a universal
computable sequence of lower semicomputable functions.
It is not difficult to check that the notion of lower semicomputability is an effective version of the standard topological
notion of lower semicontinuity: a function f : X → R∪{∞} is lower semicontinuous (in the usual sense of {x ∈ X | f (x) > r}
being open for each r ∈ R) if and only if the set {(x, r) | x ∈ X, r ∈ R, f (x) > r} is open in the product X × R.
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Lemma 14. If f : X → [0,∞] is lower semicomputable and C ∈ N ∪ {0}, the set {x | f (x) > C} is effectively open.
Proof. Let ∪{Uk | k ∈ A}, with A ⊆ N recursively enumerable, be a representation of the effectively open set {(x, r) | x ∈
X, r ∈ R, f (x) > r} as a union of basic sets in X ×R. The set {x | f (x) > C} can be represented as the union of the basic sets
{x ∈ X | ∃r ∈ R : (x, r) ∈ Uk} over k ∈ A such that sup{r | ∃x : (x, r) ∈ Uk} > C . 
A function f : X → R is called computable if both f and−f are lower semicomputable. It is easy to see that the analogue
of Lemma 13 does not hold for computable functions.
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